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Interpretive approachAceh, located in the northernmost area of Sumatra Island, is one of the regions that suffered the most damage
from the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. The process of reconstruction after a large-scale disaster is consid-
ered an opportunity to create a safer society, especially for developing countries, however the accumulation
of knowledge about how to improve reconstruction is insufﬁcient. The affected areas have diverse social and
economic characteristics and unprecedented restoration efforts have been made. The Indian Ocean tsunami
disaster, therefore, provides numerous research opportunities, and many surveys and other researches
have been conducted to better understand what happened and how the reconstruction process could be im-
proved. However, the majority of such research has focused on housing reconstruction, rebuilding livelihoods
and community rehabilitation and there has been only limited research on transportation-related issues.
Thus, there is signiﬁcance in evaluating the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, a di-
mension that has yet to be examined systematically. As a ﬁrst step in the effort to evaluate various aspects
of the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, this research aims to present three
transportation-related issues within the reconstruction process—1) the road network in the Banda Aceh
coastal area, 2) mobility in relocation sites, and 3) reconstruction of the Banda Aceh–Meulaboh road—and
to conduct a preliminary analysis of these issues by adding the viewpoint of disaster management and recon-
struction, the authors' area of specialization. For conducting a preliminary analysis, existing information such
as research papers, articles and reports and data collected through interviews and ﬁeld reconnaissance
conducted by the authors were utilized as much as possible, and such “qualitative data” was analyzed by
applying the “interpretive approach”, considered an appropriate analytical framework for qualitative data.
© 2012 International Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Indian Ocean tsunami disaster
On December 26, 2004, an extreme earthquake with a magnitude
of Mw 9.1 [1] took place near the Sunda Trench, off the coast of the
Indonesian island of Sumatra. The earthquake generated a large tsu-
nami that spread across the entire Indian Ocean, causing devastating
damage to the coastal areas of countries that face the Indian Ocean,
including Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, India, and even some East
African countries [2].
Aceh, located in the northernmost area of Sumatra Island, is one of the
regions that suffered the most damage from the Indian Ocean tsunami
(Fig. 1).umaru).
Source: Prepared by the author based on AusAID map [3].
Fig. 1. Location map.
Source: Prepared by the author based on AusAID map [3].
ssociation of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2 A total of six ﬁeld surveys (interviews and ﬁeld reconnaissance) in Aceh, Indonesia
were conducted during the period from January 2005 to September 2011 to collect in-
formation and to better understand the progress of reconstruction and related issues.
Semi-structured interview survey method was used. It takes at least about an hour in
average (sometime more) for one interview to create “rapport” with a respondent to
obtain wider range of information, therefore the number of samples is comparatively
small if comparing to the sample numbers of quantitative analysis. The actual purpose
of the interview was not to identify issues in transportation in the reconstruction pro-
cess in Aceh but to understand the impacts and response of the community to the di-
saster and to identify issues in housing reconstruction. However, during the interview
survey, many of the respondents expressed concerns on transportation when they
explained their living environment.
3 The “interpretive approach” is an analytical framework for understanding social
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dead or missing in Indonesia (approx. 0.1% of the country's total popula-
tion) and an estimated 1500 km of coastline was affected, mainly on the
west coast of northern Sumatra Island [5]. The tsunami that struck the
coastal area of Banda Aceh measured 6–12 m high [6] and traveled
2 km inland from the coast, reaching as far as 4 km in some places. Thou-
sands of buildings were washed away. Urban infrastructure such as
roads, electricity, water supply and telecommunication, and public ser-
vices such as education, health and public transportation, received mas-
sive damage. In Banda Aceh alone there were approximately 15,000
people dead or missing, nearly 10% of the population at the time. Many
peoplewere also forced to live in evacuation shelters. The overall number
of evacuees in Indonesia is said to have been 500,000 at its highest point
[7], many of them from Banda Aceh. The tsunami struck approximately
30 min to 1 h after the earthquake, but many people in Banda Aceh
were unable to escape in time as the city was unprepared for tsunamis.
This, in addition to the fact that residential areas along the coastline of
Banda Aceh were developed on low lying ground, offering no higher
ground for evacuation,was the primary factor that ampliﬁed the damage.
Meanwhile, the western coastal area was also subject to massive
damage, with tsunami heights of approximately 15 m to 30 m [6].
Villages located along the western coastal area suffered a devastating
amount of damage and the arterial road (national road) running
along the west coast was fragmented in several places.
The extent of the damage from the disasterwas estimated at 46.5 tril-
lion Rp. [8,9], rivaling the 50.4 trillion Rp. gross regional product of Aceh
Province [10]. Looking at Indonesia as a whole, however, economic
growth from 2004 to 2006 was not particularly impacted [9]. The effect
of the disaster on the Indonesian economy as a whole was minimal.
1.2. Motivation and purpose
After the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, large-scale disasters such as
cyclone Nargis in Myanmar, the Great Sichuan Earthquake in China, the
Haiti Earthquake, and the Great East Japan Earthquake have occurred fre-
quently. The process of reconstruction after a large-scale disaster is con-
sidered an opportunity to create a safer society, especially for
developing countries. However, the accumulation of knowledge about
how to improve reconstruction is insufﬁcient, because research on
post-disaster reconstruction has only started relatively recently. Even in
Japan, such research only became active after the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake in 1995.
The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster was one of the largest disasters
we have ever experienced. The affected areas have diverse social and
economic characteristics, and unprecedented restoration efforts have
been made. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, therefore, provides
numerous research opportunities. In the Aceh region, the target area for
this research, many surveys and other researches have been conducted
to better understandwhat happened and how the reconstruction process
could be improved. However, the majority of such research has fo-
cused on housing reconstruction (e.g. [11,12]), rebuilding livelihoods
(e.g. [13,14]) and community rehabilitation (e.g. [15]).
Although the tsunami disaster brought fundamental changes in
the concepts of land use and how people live, which are closely related
to transportation and transportation services, there has been only limited
research on transportation-related issues. Thus, there is signiﬁcance in
evaluating the reconstruction of Aceh from a transportation perspective,
a dimension that has yet to be examined systematically.
As a ﬁrst step in the effort to evaluate various aspects of the recon-
struction of Aceh from a transportation perspective, this research1 BRR: Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Wilayah dan Kehidupan Masyarakat
Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Kepulauan Nias, Provinsi Sumatera Utara
(Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Regions and Community of
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and the Nias Islands of the Province of North Sumatra),
established in April 2005.aims to present three transportation-related issues within the recon-
struction process—1) the road network in the Banda Aceh coastal
area, 2) mobility in relocation sites, and 3) reconstruction of the Banda
Aceh–Meulaboh road—and to conduct a preliminary analysis of these
issues by adding the viewpoint of disastermanagement and reconstruc-
tion, the authors' area of specialization.
2. Analytical framework
Since the purpose of the research is to conduct a preliminary analysis
of the underlying issues in the Aceh reconstruction, existing information
such as research papers, other articles and reports on the reconstruction
process as well as data collected through interviews and ﬁeld recon-
naissance conducted by the authors beginning just after the disaster
through to the present2 were utilized as much as possible.
The collected information, including both descriptions in research
papers, technical reports and other articles and interviews recorded
in the authors' ﬁeld notes, was treated as “qualitative data.” The “inter-
pretive approach3”, considered an appropriate analytical framework
for qualitative data, was applied for analysis.
In Section 3 and Section 5, issues were initially identiﬁed through
the authors' ﬁeld survey and analysis and discussions on the issues
have been made using the existing information and authors' observa-
tion at the ﬁeld. As for the analysis and discussion in Section 4, the re-
sults of interview surveys were also utilized as important information
to understand the situation.
3. Road network reconstruction in the Banda Aceh coastal area
3.1. General
The road network in the coastal area of Banda Aceh was severely
damaged by the tsunami. After the disaster, by reviewing the spatial
plan4 of Banda Aceh, a reconstruction master plan covering the road
network plan was formulated. In the master plan, the proposed road
network followed the one that existed before the tsunami, with some
roads designated as tsunami escape routes because housing had been
allowed in the coastal areas affected by the tsunami.
This section ﬁrst outlines the reconstruction planning process that is
the basis for understanding the road network plan and then evaluates
the road network in coastal area from the perspective of tsunami
disaster management.
3.2. Urban planning process and tsunami disaster management
The formulation of an urban reconstruction plan to build a city
thatwould be safe from tsunamis started immediately after the disaster.events using qualitative data obtained from interviews, observations, and records in
text, voice, or video formats, and is characterized by describing the entirety of a situa-
tion by interpreting causal relationships between individual acts and/or subjective
meanings revealed in the process of organizing the information. In addition, at least
one author was involved in ongoing ﬁeld surveys; the data collected thereby was con-
sidered consistent, an important element for securing the reliability of qualitative data.
4 In Indonesia, urban planning is often referred to as “spatial planning.”
Source: JICA [17]
Fig. 2. Land use plan proposed in the master plan.
Source: JICA [17].
Photo 1. Housing built along the coast (August 2011).
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construction plan, called the Blueprint, in January 2005. In the Blueprint,
the city was divided into multiple zones, with the area within 2 km
of the shoreline named the Buffer Zone6 and restricted for housing.
The concept for this zone was basically followed in the Reconstruction
Master Plan supported by JICA,7 and a top-down approach was taken
for this master plan planning process.
On the other hand, in contrast to the top-down approach, and in
response to the people's requests for early housing reconstruction,
USAID8 began to support the formulation of a Village Plan, a5 BAPPENAS: Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, National Development
Planning Agency, Indonesia.
6 According to Sugiyasu et al., the Buffer Zone was changed 4 times on the Blueprint,
the Blueprint revision, JICA zoning, and the Village Plan. At each point of change, the
Buffer Zone was handled as a restricted area, an area for residences with permission,
an area required for evacuations, and an area for housing based on the agreement of
residents [16].
7 JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), which provided overall support in
the drafting of the urban reconstruction plan, began formulating the Master Plan in
March 2005 to support the concept of the Blueprint.
8 USAID (United States Agency for International Development) was also an active bi-
lateral donor organization in Aceh reconstruction.community level reconstruction plan, in May 2005 through a partici-
patory and bottom-up method undertaken in parallel with JICA's
master plan formulation process. The opinions of residents who
wished to stay in the same village were respected; based on such
community agreements, approval was granted to rebuild residences
in coastal areas.9 As a result, many houses were rebuilt in the zones
designated as restricted on the Blueprint, that is, in coastal areas
that had been ﬂooded by the 2004 tsunami (Photo 1).
In both the Blueprint and the Master Plan that followed it, the con-
cept for minimizing damage was to restrict housing and economic
activity in the areas that had been catastrophically damaged in the
2004 tsunami, minimizing the number of people in these areas. How-
ever, after the Village Plan was accepted by BRR and housing recon-
struction allowed in the coastal areas, the concept had to be changed
from regulating activity through zoning to ensuring safety through
disaster prevention measures.9 Although it was said that this was done in agreement with the wishes of the com-
munity, through interviews it was discovered that this was not necessarily the case.
Most people had to return to the place where they originally lived because they had
no other choice.
Source: JICA [17]
Fig. 3. Escape route network as proposed in the master plan.
Source: JICA [17].
Photo 2. Improved road (designated as an evacuation route) in 2011.
14 R. Matsumaru et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 11–19Taking this change of concept into account, JICA considered and
proposed coastal structures that incorporated the placement of evacua-
tion roads and facilities within the reconstruction master plan, whichSource: JICA [17]
Fig. 4. Comparison of inundated area
Source: JICA [17].was ﬁnally published in December 2005 (Fig. 2). In addition, as a
model project, roads were improved (widened) to serve as part of an
evacuation route network, signs were installed, and four-story commu-
nity buildings on pilotis were built (to function as evacuation sites) [18].
3.3. Evaluation of the road network as an escape route for tsunamis
As no tsunami prevention structures along the coast of Banda Aceh
have yet been installed, even a small-scale tsunami could cause a
great deal of damage. Providing somemeans to escape from a tsunami
is the onlyway to save residents' lives. In this context, the proper func-
tioning of escape routes in the event of a tsunami is crucial for reduc-
ing damage. In this paper, such functioning will be evaluated from the
perspectives of 1) an escape route network for the whole coastal area
and 2) community level road networks, as discussed below.
3.3.1. Road network for the whole coastal area
In the reconstruction Master Plan, some roads are designated
as tsunami escape routes and form a network (Fig. 3), and some des-
ignated escape routes have already been improved (Photo 2) with
Japanese assistance.
During the site survey in September 2011, improved escape routes
were found to be well-maintained and capable of functioning properly
in the event of a tsunami. When the route is observed and evaluated
as part of a whole network, however, the following major issues can
be identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst is the extent of the escape route network. The two ﬁgures
shown (Fig. 4) compare the area inundated by the 2004 tsunami with
the escape route network proposed in the Master Plan.
As shown in the ﬁgures, the escape route network extends only up
to the national road (indicated in red) that was ﬂooded by the 2004
tsunami, with only a single inland route designated as an escape
route. It must be said that the extent of the network is insufﬁcient
from the perspective of ensuring a safe evacuation. Furthermore,
when evacuees arrive on the national road, they are supposed to be
carried along in the northeast/southwest directions. However, these
directions are not the right ones for escaping an imminent tsunami,
as the road runs parallel to the coastline. In addition, there is a high prob-
ability of creating further congestion as evacuees become entangledwith
people evacuating on motorcycles, etc., and thrown into confusion.
Additional escape routes further inland are, therefore, required.
Another issue with the escape route network comes from
using the road network that was created before the disaster. Former
road alignments and bridge locations were preconditions whenand evacuation route network.
Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.
Fig. 5. Comparison of inundated area and evacuation route network.
Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.
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the shortest distance from the coast to inland areas. It is understand-
able that roads form the framework of a city and acquisition of land
for new roads would be difﬁcult. Nevertheless, having allowed hous-
ing in the disaster-stricken areas and adopted the concept of decreas-
ing damage through evacuation as the primary countermeasure, a
fundamental change in the road network for tsunami evacuation
would have been one option to ensure the safety of the area.3.3.2. Community level road network
Since owners retained title to the same land they owned before
the disaster, many villages and/or communities were rebuilt in almost
the same form as before the tsunami. No measures similar to the land
readjustments in Japan were undertaken.
Looking at Blang Oi Village (Fig. 5, Photo 3), located approximately
1 km from the coast, where the authors conducted ﬁeld surveys, the
shape of land plots was maintained with roads rebuilt in the same lo-
cations as before the disaster.Within the village, such roads are narrow
(approx. 5 m) and winding, causing problems both for the road net-
work and for the physical conditions of tsunami disaster management.Photo 3. Blang Oi Village on the coast of Banda Aceh (August 2008).Although trafﬁc volume in the village is limited and two cars can
pass each other, a situation of unfavorably narrow and winding roads
hinders smooth transportation that the authors experienced. Further-
more, the shortest distance to themain roads that have been designated
as evacuation routes cannot be taken when using automobiles or
motorcycles because of poor linkage to the main road. These condi-
tions lengthen the time required for evacuation, leading to a greater
likelihood of damage. Furthermore, the density of the residences is
not very high now, but if it should increase with a growing economy,
leading to densely constructed houses of two stories or higher, col-
lapsed buildings in the wake of an earthquake could block roads and
contribute to increased damage.
Several rebuilt residential areas in the same situation as Blang Oi
can be seen near the coast. When evaluating the community level
road networks from a tsunami disaster management viewpoint, it
would be hard to say that the restored communities are safer than
before as they remain subject to a repeat of the disaster. They must,
therefore, be reviewed for safety from tsunami disasters and im-
provements made as early as possible.
3.4. Discussion
The Great East Japan Earthquake disaster on March 11, 2011, left
nearly 19,000 people dead or missing; most were killed or swept
away by the tsunami. Some victims were caught by the tsunami due
to trafﬁc congestion during their escape. This suggests the need for
comprehensive preparedness combining a network of physical escape
routes with trafﬁc management.
In the Banda Aceh coastal area, although restoration of the road
network is underway, and some attempts to create a safer area can be ob-
served, the escape route network should be expanded and the physical
condition of community level roadnetworks should be improved. In ad-
dition to such physical improvements, a trafﬁc management perspec-
tive to facilitate smooth evacuation must be introduced.
As determined through interviews and simulations [18], the 2004
tsunami arrived on the shores of Banda Aceh approximately 30 min
after the earthquake, giving residents only a limited time to evacuate.
Special trafﬁc management policies should be considered to smooth
trafﬁc ﬂow in the event a tsunami is predicted, such as limiting all
coastal area roads to one-way trafﬁc heading inland.
Photo 4. Labuy relocation site (Photo: August 2008).
Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.
Fig. 6. Location of Pante Riak and Labuy.
Source: Prepared by the author based on Google Earth.
16 R. Matsumaru et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 11–19Making such measures effective requires further quantitative
analyses with trafﬁc simulations of the escape route network. Addi-
tionally, the implementation of drills and awareness programs are
also desirable10 to ensure that residents understand the trafﬁc mea-
sures against tsunami.
4. Housing relocation and mobility
4.1. General
Tsunami victims who lost their houses and could not rebuild on the
land where they lived before the tsunami were relocated to collective
housing relocation areas.11 In Banda Aceh, these housing relocation
sites are located on the periphery of urban areas that were unaffected10 New residents have moved to coastal areas in addition to those who lived there be-
fore the tsunami. There is some concern that these new residents have no experience
of the tsunami disaster. During the May 2010 earthquake, many coastal residents (both
2004 disaster victims and newer residents) failed to evacuate, suggesting that aware-
ness of the tsunami disaster will decline with the passing of time.
11 Victims who could not rebuild their houses in their original locations because the
land was washed away, or who lived in rented housing, were eligible to apply for col-
lective relocation. For this type of housing relocation site, the government of Indonesia
provided the land (ownership transfer or free leasing, etc.) while NGOs, etc. built the
houses. Victims who moved to the relocation sites got title to both land and house at
no charge. Basic infrastructures including roads, water, and electricity, are in place in
all housing relocation areas, with some, depending on the donors in charge of develop-
ment, also including meeting halls and schools.by the tsunami or on hilly areas some distance from the Banda Aceh
city center. Victims moved to such relocation areas were forced to live
in a totally different environment from the one in which they had orig-
inally lived.
According to the survey conducted by the authors, most residents
living in the relocation sites are satisﬁed with their current living con-
ditions, although they note insufﬁcient public transportation as a
transportation-related problem at the relocation sites.
This section focuses on Labuy and Pante Riek (Fig. 6), two reloca-
tion sites with different characteristics, in discussing the importance
of public transportation for livelihood recovery.4.2. Existing situation and evaluation of relocation sites
4.2.1. Labuy
Labuy is located on a hill about 15 km east of the center of Banda
Aceh, more than 30 min away by car. Several donors built housing
complexes on land provided by the government in the neighborhoods
of Labuy (Photo 4), and people began moving there in 2007. That
year, about 15,000 people lived in the area, whose population was
expected to double over the next 5 years [19,20].
In the housing block where the survey was conducted, an Arabic
donor had constructed semidetached houses (Photo 4 (left): 36 m2,
2 rooms+living room and kitchen). Both houses and land were pro-
vided to relocated residents at no cost.
Source: BRR [23]
Fig. 7. BRR's plan for reconstruction activities.
Source: BRR [23].
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main road with its buses and public transportation services to the
Banda Aceh city center, residents have to walk a certain distance or
take transportation services to the main road that are provided by in-
dividual service providers, such as becaks or single-seat motor bikes.
In interviews held in 2008 and 2011, people indicated that they
were generally satisﬁed with their lives but dissatisﬁed with the
lack of public transport.
In December 2007, a report prepared by ADB/BRR [19,20] noted
the importance of public transport and recommended that services
be provided to residents. In the interview survey conducted in August
2008, however, the lack of transport services was raised as an issue in
the area. Furthermore, since the same issue of public transport also
came up in the April 2011 survey, the problem appears to remain
unresolved, with sufﬁcient mobility for residents not yet secured.
4.2.2. Pante Riek
Pante Riek is located along the Aceh River about 4 km from the
coastline where the relocated lived prior to the tsunami disaster. A
Taiwanese NGO, the Tzu Chi Foundation, has built housing complexes
on land provided by the Indonesian Government.
According to a report by Nakazato et al. [12], about 700 houses were
constructed on the site, with each house measuring 42 m2. The report
notes that residents showed general satisfaction with life at the reloca-
tion site, and did not express dissatisfaction regarding public transport
at the time they were surveyed in March 2008.
In the survey conducted in 2011 by the authors, residents remained
satisﬁed with their lives overall but expressed the view that public
transportationwas insufﬁcient. The awareness or needs of the residents
had perhaps changed over the several years since their relocation.12
However, as the Pante Riek site is located relatively close to the
Banda Aceh city center, with easy access to necessary activities and
resources, the problem of public transportation expressed by the res-
idents would not be recognized as a major issue by the authors when
it is compared to the same problem at the Labuy relocation site.
4.3. Discussion
As of 2011, at both the Labuy and Pante Riek relocation sites, no
planned public transportation services had been provided. This inade-
quate provision of public transportation services, particularly in areas
affected by the tsunami and in relocation sites in Banda Aceh and the
vicinity, is considered to be due to the following reasons.
The ﬁrst reason public transportation has not been properly pro-
vided is because of the principles of reconstruction established by
BRR. According to the BRR reports [22,23], supplying houses to tsunami
victimswasmade the highest priority, while restoration of physical and
social infrastructure was planned to come later (Fig. 7).
Due to the application of this reconstruction principle, the restora-
tion of physical and social infrastructure could not keep pace with the
reconstruction of houses, causing insufﬁcient provision of public ser-
vices relative to the needs of people in rebuilt housing areas and relo-
cation sites. Particularly with respect to public transportation, despite
the very high demands on public transport because tsunami victims
had lost property such as vehicles and motorcycles, altering their modes
of transport, the provision of public transport services was inadequate
to meet their mobility needs.
Another reason was the lack of a proper policy and plan for public
transportation services. Although the restoration of transportation
was mentioned in the BRR report [22], the transportation networks12 The needs of victims change with the passing of time. As an example from tempo-
rary housing, people are initially satisﬁed to have been able to enter the housing. How-
ever, it has been reported that discontent increases with the passing of time and
changes in lifestyle [21]. It can also easily be predicted that changes in awareness will
occur in a similar manner when moving into permanent housing.it addressed were those over comparatively longer distances, such as
those linking major cities with sea and air transport, and there was no
clear description of the restoration of public transport services within
cities or suburbs. This shows that the government placed a lower pri-
ority on the restoration or provision of public transport services.
Transport services in the areas affected by the tsunami had pri-
marily been provided by private companies or individuals, and this
may be one reason that public transportation services for relocation
areas were not included within the scope of public sector reconstruc-
tion, while securing land, supplying basic infrastructure, and provid-
ing houses and other social facilities were considered to be public
sector tasks.
According to interview surveys with residents, people who moved
to the relocation sites were not given a choice about their place of res-
idence, and most could live only where they were placed. Although
the authors surveyed only two sites, it was noted that Labuy is 15 km
away from the city center while Pante Riek is closer and more conve-
nient. Even if the victims lived in equally convenient places before the
disaster, there is disparity in the convenience of their new residences,
including transportation, irrespective of their intentions.
The process of reviving after a disaster is extremely vulnerable,
and even small expenses for transport might have a negative impact
on the victims. Therefore, special care for the victims is necessary to
ensure their revitalization. In this context, inequality in terms of mo-
bility convenience and cost will lead to differences in the progress of
rebuilding their lives. Therefore securing fairness in mobility among
victims is essential, and should be done by providing appropriate
transportation means based on an analysis of user characteristics
and demand. This is the responsibility of the government, and it is
necessary to have a plan to provide public transportation that inte-
grates with the housing relocation plan.
The problem with transport at relocation sites is not an issue
unique to Aceh but can also be seen in other areas of Indonesia and
Sri Lanka that were affected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. This may
be an issue we will face with housing relocation schemes for tsunami
victims of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the example offers
a good lesson for considering the provision of appropriate public
transportation.
5. Reconstruction of the Banda Aceh–Meulaboh road
5.1. General
Extending approximately 240 km, the Banda Aceh–Meulaboh
road is an arterial road classiﬁed as a national road13) that runs13 According to the Indonesian Road Classiﬁcation system, roads are classiﬁed into
two categories: primary roads and secondary roads. Primary roads are further divided
into arterial roads, collector roads, and local roads. Arterial roads and class 1 collector
roads are administered by the Ministry of Public Works and called “national roads.”
18 R. Matsumaru et al. / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 11–19along the west coast of northern Sumatra Island. With low road den-
sity and limited access between inland and coastal areas, the Banda
Aceh–Meulaboh road was the only link between these areas. Most
of the people and goods traveling in the region were highly depen-
dent on the road, which supported the regional economy.
Since much of the road was located near the shoreline, it suffered
devastating damage by the tsunami. Between BandaAceh andMeulaboh,
approximately 57 km of the road was completely washed away, and
140 kmwas severely damaged. In addition, 76 bridges—approximately
half of the 142 bridges along the affected section—were reported dam-
aged by the tsunami [24].
Two different donors, Japan and the United States, undertook recon-
struction of the road. An imbalance in the progress of reconstruction
between the two donors was evident. It is inferred that this imbalance
affected the reconstruction of the communities and economy along
the road. This section outlines the reconstruction process and discusses
the issues related to the road reconstruction.5.2. Reconstruction process
The Indonesian army was in charge of clearing road obstacles and
emergency repairs immediately after the disaster. Emergency repairs
were completed in March 2005.
The ﬁrst survey for reconstruction of the Banda Aceh–Meulaboh
road was conducted by the Japanese government in March 2005.
Shortly after the Japanese survey began, the U.S. also dispatched an
assessment team to assist in restoring the same road. Subsequently,
the governments of Indonesia, Japan, and the U.S. reached an agree-
ment regarding assistance for road reconstruction work. It was decided
that the U.S. would take charge of restoring the section between Banda
Aceh and Calang, and Japan the section between Calang and Meulaboh.
Based on this agreement between the three governments, the
Japanese team started reconstruction work for the 120 km section
between Calang and Meulaboh in May 2005, following the basic
alignment of the existing road. Reconstruction work for this section
began in December 2005 following a design and procurement pro-
cess. Within approximately one year, by December 2006, the work
was completed and the road in service. Travel time from Calang to
Meulaboh was thus shortened frommore than 7 h to 2.5 h with com-
pletion of the road restoration work [25].
On the other hand, reconstruction of the 145 km section between
Banda Aceh and Calang that was to be performed by the U.S. was de-
layed. The ﬁnal road alignment was decided in June 2006 and the
work begun at the end of 2006, with reconstruction ultimately com-
pleted around mid-2011.Photo 5. Roads that continued to be used after o5.3. Issues and discussion
With two donors applying different ideas to reconstruction, the
progress of reconstruction was imbalanced. This imbalance led to six
years of imperfect road network conditions that affected the following:
1) economic revitalization and economic loss, 2) community recovery,
and 3) people's feeling of inequality in reconstruction.
5.3.1. Effect on economic revitalization and economic loss
Due to the delay of reconstruction work on the section between
Banda Aceh and Calang, the damaged road, especially sections where
road alignment was to be changed, continued to be used after only
emergency restoration work had been completed. Even as late as
August 2008, more than three and a half years after the disaster,
there were still several places along the road where conditions were
very poor or where rivers had to be crossed using boats (Photo 5).
When the authors traveled by automobile from Banda Aceh to
Meulaboh in August 2008, it took nearly 9 h. At that time, the road
between Calang and Meulaboh had already been restored, and travel
time for that segmentwas roughly two and a half hours. Approximately
three-fourths of the time required for the entire trip, therefore, was
used in covering approximately half the total distance. According to
the driver who accompanied the authors, the time required to travel
between Banda Aceh and Meulaboh before the disaster was 5 to 6 h.
Thus, it had become necessary to spend an entire day to cover just a
half-day's distance.
The segment between Banda Aceh and Calang has higher trafﬁc
volume than the segment between Calang and Meulaboh [24]. It took
more than six years for the entire road to be opened, more than four
years after the Calang–Meulaboh segment. This type of delay in recon-
struction kept the road network imperfect and perhaps contributed to
the stagnation of goods distribution, sharply increased freight costs,
and the loss of various economic opportunities. It can thus be inferred
that the delay greatly affected the region's economy and recovery.
5.3.2. Effects on community recovery and inequality in reconstruction
The authors specialize in disastermanagement and disaster recovery/
reconstruction, and from experience, recognize that rebuilding liveli-
hoods, or returning to the lifestyle enjoyed prior to a disaster, is one
of the most crucial issues in community recovery. The delay in the re-
construction of the region's arterial road,which left victims in a difﬁcult
situation while they tried to rebuild their lives in their own communi-
ties, was likely a factor that led residents to leave their communities
despite having hoped to rebuild their lives there.
Building a road to high speciﬁcations in a safe place, shifting its
alignment to prevent damage from another disaster, was important,nly emergency repair work (August 2008).
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sidered sound. However, continuing to use a roadwith only emergency
repairs for a period of more than six years, and forcing inconvenient
transportation on users is questionable. Appropriate measures such as
temporarily paving or temporary bridge installation could have been
taken in order to help rebuild lives in a more timely manner.
In addition, when recalling that the segment between Calang and
Meulaboh was restored to nearly its original state in two years, it can
be said that this contributed to a recovery disparity between commu-
nities as well as feelings of unfairness.
Developing countries like Indonesia cannot do without foreign
assistance after such a large-scale disaster. Nevertheless, recipients
should set reconstruction policy. Efforts to minimize imbalance in
reconstruction are necessary because people's lives are highly depen-
dent on roads in areas that lack a range of transportation modes such
as railways and mass transit. The difference in road restoration prog-
ress was directly related to a disparity in people's progress in recover-
ing from the disaster.
6. Conclusion
Reconstruction of Aceh as a whole seems to be progressing well.
However, some issues remain even when observing the restoration
only from a transport-related perspective. In this paper, three cases
of reconstruction in Aceh were examined and issues were discussed.
Those issues can be classiﬁed into those related to “better urban de-
velopment,” such as securing smooth evacuation routes and providing
appropriate mobility to victims, and “better reconstruction,” such as
providing adequate public transportation services to avoid unfairness
among the victims.
The issues related to “better urban development” are the ones that
need to be addressed by incorporating current research ﬁndings re-
lated to large-scale disasters like the Great East Japan Earthquake and
Hurricane Katrina, which will be important in Aceh from now on.
On the other hand, the reconstruction of Aceh is progressing, and
for this reason, solutions for issues toward “better reconstruction”
cannot be applied there. Therefore, knowledge, ﬁndings and lessons
that have been obtained through this research are expected to be uti-
lized in reconstruction after other disasters. In particular, the situation
inAceh has shown that an uneven distribution of transportation services
resulted in unfairness in reconstruction and highlighted the prominent
role that transportation plays in promoting well-balanced reconstruc-
tion. This lesson is also suggestive with regard to recovery from the
Great East Japan Earthquake.
As was mentioned in Section 1, the evaluation and discussion of
the cases presented in this paper were made primarily based on
ﬁeld surveys conducted by the authors and on a review of existing in-
formation. There are, undeniably, many areas that need further and
more detailed examination, especially through quantitative analysis.
90% of the world's natural disasters are concentrated in Asia, with
developing countries particularly vulnerable to damage. Under these
circumstances, and as a result of the Great East Japan Earthquake,
matters related to transportation in city areas and relocation sites, as
well as transportation planning for building safe, robust and resilient
communities are now being much discussed. The authors' hope, there-
fore, that the observations in this paper will be of some help in future
research on disaster management and transportation planning, and
in promoting collaborative work between both sectors, particularly in
developing countries.[Note] The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reﬂect the view or policies of the Japan Inter-
national Cooperation Agency (JICA).References
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